[Note: This is the second post in the series examining the uses of theistic arguments in Christian apologetics.]
Cosmological arguments are theistic arguments that start from creation and work back to a Creator. They argue a posteriori, from effect to cause and are based on the principle of causality which states that every event has a cause, or that every thing that begins has a cause. One of the oldest incarnations of this form is known as the kalam cosmological argument.
Although the name was given by William Lane Craig, one of the most ardent of defenders of the argument, its history can be traced to Islamic philosophers such as Alfarabi, Al Ghazli, and Avicenna, and scholastic philosophers like Bonaventure. The argument was most famously opposed by Thomas Aquinas, who believed it philosophically possible (though biblically untrue) that God could have caused the universe from eternity.
The basic outline of the kalam argument is:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
The first premise is generally considered unobjectionable. Few atheists are willing to concede, as philosopher Quentin Smith once remarked, that "the most reasonable belief is that we came from nothing, by nothing, and for nothing." Most reasonable people refuse to accept that the universe sprang into existence uncaused out of nothing.
The second premise, therefore, is the heart of the argument and the point that must be defended. Historically, two philosophical and two scientific lines of evidence are generally given in support of this premise. As apologist Norman Geisler explains, the scientific evidence is based heavily on the Second Law of Thermodynamics which affirms that the universe is running out of usable energy and, hence, cannot be eternal. Other supportive evidence is taken from Big Bang cosmology, including the expanding universe and the purported radiation echo of the original explosion -- all of which are taken to support the idea of a beginning of the universe. For the purposes of this post, we'll ignore the scientific lines of argument since most people agree with the standard theories.
The two philosophical arguments share a similar approach. One is an argument from the impossibility of an actual infinite number of things. The other is an argument from the impossibility of forming an actually infinite collection of things by adding one member after another. While I consider the first argument to be more interesting, it's ability to persuade relies on an understanding of mathematical concepts such as infinity and set theory that are foreign to most people (including me).
The second argument, on the other hand, is more intuitive. If we accept that the converse of our second premise is true then we believe that the universe did not begin to exist, that it had no beginning. A series of events in time that has no beginning would be an actual infinite. In other words, if the series of past events had no beginning, it is actually infinite. An actual infinite, according to set theory, is a collection of things with an infinite number of members. One of the unique traits of an actual infinite is that part of an actually infinite set is equal to whole set. For example, in an actually infinite set of numbers, the number of even numbers in the set is equal to all of the numbers in the set. This follows because an infinite set of numbers contains an infinite number of even numbers as well as an infinite number of all numbers; hence a part of the set is equal to the whole of the set. Another trait of the actual infinite is that nothing can be added to it. Not one book can be added to an actually infinite library or one painting to an actually infinite museum.
The basic form of the second argument can therefore be outlined as:
1. The series of events in time is a collection formed by adding one member after another.
2. A collection formed by adding one member after another cannot be actually infinite.
3. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.
The primary point of contention with this argument would be that while an infinite collection cannot be formed by beginning at a point and adding members, it might be possible to create an infinite collection by never beginning but yet ending at a specific point. In other words, while the universe may not have had a beginning we could start at an ending point (i.e., the present) and count back toward eternity. Craig explains why this counter to the argument is implausible:
The idea of a beginningless series ending in the present seems to be absurd. To give just one illustration: suppose we meet a man who claims to have been counting from eternity and is now finishing: ..., -3, -2, -1, 0. We could ask, why did he not finish counting yesterday or the day before or the year before? By then an infinite time had already elapsed, so that he should have finished by then. Thus, at no point in the infinite past could we ever find the man finishing his countdown, for by that point he should have already be done! In fact, no matter how far back into the past we go, we can never find the man counting at all, for at any point we reach he will have already finished. But if at no point in the past do we find him counting this contradicts the hypothesis that he has been counting from eternity. This illustrates the fact that the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition is equally impossible whether one proceeds to or from infinity.
Assuming these arguments are convincing, we are can conclude that the universe began to exist. The next set of questions that remain are whether the entity that caused the universe to come into existence was either natural or non-natural and either personal or non-personal.
The first set appears to be the easiest to resolve. Since "natural causes" are causes which exist within the universe, not outside of it, any cause that preceded the creation of the universe must be, by definition, non-natural (or, if you prefer, supernatural). The second set is a bit trickier, and is contingent on whether the cause of the universe was sufficient (meaning that the existence of the cause alone guarantees the existence of the universe) or whether the cause had to be set in motion by a rational (hence, personal) agent.
An example of how to think about the answer is provided by Bill Ramsey:
To make this clear consider the sufficient cause of lighting a match. When a match is struck against the proper surface, it ignites, and thus striking the match is the sufficient cause of an ignited match. Note that as soon as a sufficient cause exists, the effect follows immediately; there is no gap between the cause and the effect. This raises a question: if the sufficient cause of the universe has always existed, then why has the universe not always existed?The answer to this question is that the cause of the universe is a personal agent who willed the creation of a finite universe. To use the match example, once the match is struck the effect immediately follows, but if a personal agent does not strike the match, the effect does not have to follow. Likewise, if the cause of the universe is personal, the universe does not have to be eternal like its sufficient cause. Instead, the universe could have been willed into existence much like a person wills to light a match. Once the cause is set into motion the effect follows, but only after the cause is set into motion; and a personal agent has the power not to set the cause in motion. Thus we can conclude that the cause of the universe is personal.
Incorporating the elements into a whole, we can conclude that the universe was caused to come into existence at a finite point in time by a rational, personal Being. This conclusion, while not indisputable, certainly presents one more reasonable argument why it is more likely than not that God exists. It increases the plausibility that theism is true and atheism is false. Unfortunately, kalam, like all arguments for natural theology, can only drop us off at the door of theism. Special revelation is required to carry us up the steps and inside the inner sanctum where God reveals himself -- specifically in the form of Jesus Christ.
See also:
- William Lane Craig, "Initial Arguments: A Defense of the Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God"
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Cosmological Argument
The following is a list of the most significant criticisms that have been offered against the kalam argument, with responses by proponents of the argument. This list was taken, with slight modification, from the Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics and is included as reference for presenting a more thorough argument:
Eternal Eventless Universe -- Some suggest that big bang only signals the first eruption in a previously eternal universe. That is, the universe had eternal quiescence before this first event. The big bang singularity only marks the transition from primal physical stuff. Hence, there is no need for a Creator to make something out of nothing.
No known natural laws could account for this violent eruption out of eternal quietude. Some theists assert that an eternally quiet universe is physically impossible, since it would have to exist at absolute zero, which is impossible. Matter at the beginning was anything but cold, being collapsed into a fireball with temperatures in excess of billions of degrees Kelvin. In a lump of matter frozen to absolute zero, no first event could occur. Finally, positing eternal primordial stuff does nothing to account for the incredible order that follows the moment of the big bang. Only an intelligent Creator can account for this.
Rebounding Universe -- Some scientists have suggested that the Big Bang may only be the most recent in an eternal process of expansion and collapse. There are several problems with this hypothesis. There is no real scientific evidence for this speculation. It contradicts the Second Law, which would demand that, even if the universe were expanding and contracting, it would still be running down, so that it would ultimately collapse anyway. Logically and mathematically, the evidence for the Big Bang suggests that originally there was no space, no time, and no matter. Hence, even if the universe were somehow going through expansion and contraction from this point on, at the beginning it came into existence from nothing. This would still call for an initial Creator.
Steady State Theory -- Fred Hoyle devised the steady-state theory to avoid the need to posit a first cause. According to this hypothesis, hydrogen atoms are spontaneously coming into existence to keep the universe from running down. If so, then it would not need a beginning, since it is not running out of usable energy. There are, however, two serious problems with this speculation. First, there is no scientific evidence that hydrogen atoms are coming into existence. This has never been observed anywhere. Second, the belief that hydrogen atoms are coming into existence out of nothing is itself ex nihilo creation. It does not explain what (or Who) is creating them. Indeed, it is contrary to the fundamental principle of science (and rational thought) that everything that comes to be had a cause.
No Need for a Cause -- Some atheists argue that there is nothing incoherent about something coming into existence from nothing. They insist that the universe could come into existence "by nothing and from nothing." Proponents of the kalam argument offer several points in response. First, this is contrary to the established principle of causality. It is contrary to the scientific enterprise, which seeks a causal explanation. It is counterintuitive to believe that things just pop into existence. Many argue that the idea that nothing can cause something is logically incoherent, since "nothing" has no power to do anything--it does not even exist.
An Infinite Series -- Some thinkers believe an infinite number of moments is possible, since in mathematics infinite series are possible. For example, an infinite number of points exists between the ends of my ruler. In response to this objection, proponents of the kalam argument insist that there is a difference between a mathematical infinite series and an actual infinite series. Mathematical series are abstract, but actual series are concrete. In a concrete series it is impossible to have an infinite number, since no matter how long it is one more can always be added. But this would make it more than infinitely long, which is impossible. Further, that one can get an infinite number of abstract (dimensionless) points between the book ends on my desk does not mean one can get an infinite number of books (or even sheets of paper) between them, no matter how thin they are.
Others object that if God knows the future, which is endless, then he knows an infinite series of events. And if he knows it, then it must be possible no matter how contrary to our intuitions it may be. But defenders point out that the future is not an actual infinite series but only a potential one, there always being the possibility of one more event. Further, if an actual infinite series is impossible, then God cannot know it, since God cannot know the impossible, only the actual and the possible.
No Personal God -- Some have objected that the kalam argument does not prove God is personal or intelligent. Hence, it is not helpful to Christian theism which believes in an intelligent Creator. In response, some theists argue that only a being with free choice could bring something from nothing. Also, few theists believe that the cosmological argument alone proves a theistic God. It must be combined with the teleological argument and/or moral argument to show that God is also intelligent and moral. Second, some proponents of the kalam argument offer arguments for the personality of the First Cause, apart from the teleological or moral arguments. Three have been suggested.
The argument from a First Cause can be stated:
1. The universe had a First Cause.
2. This First Cause's act to create was either determined, undetermined, or self-determined.
3. But it cannot be determined, since there is nothing before the First Cause.
4. Neither can it be undetermined, since this is contrary to the principle of causality.
5. Hence, the act to create must have been self-determined.
6. But self-determined acts are free acts, for this is what is meant by a free act.
7. Therefore, the act by which the First Cause created the world must have been a free act of an intelligent, personal being.
The argument from the nature of intellectual causes can be stated:
1. An intelligent cause is characterized by effects which have ordered, regular effects.
2. According to the anthropic principle the universe was "fine tuned" or "pre-fitted" from the very moment of its big bang origin for the eventual emergence of human life. The most infinitesimal change of conditions in any way would have made life as we know it impossible.
3. Therefore, the First Cause must have been an intelligent cause.
The argument from the nature of natural causes states that natural causes have certain characteristics not present prior to the moment of the creation of the universe. The argument can be stated:
1. Natural causes have predetermined conditions.
2. But there were not predetermined conditions before the moment of the big bang origin of the space-time universe.
3. Therefore, the Cause was not a natural cause; it must have been a non-natural cause without predetermined conditions.
4. The only known cause which has these characteristics is a free cause.
5. Hence, the First Cause was a free cause.
Limits to the Argument -- The Argument and God's Continued Existence -- Three objections have more validity than others. They do not invalidate what the kalam argument demonstrates, but they show its severe limitations. This argument cannot prove that any God now exists. Therefore, it cannot disprove deism. Further, its assumptions are unacceptable to a pantheist, so it is useless against pantheism.
The kalam argument as such does not prove that any God now exists or necessarily exists. It is an argument about how the universe originated, not how it is sustained. It shows that a First Cause was needed to explain how the universe came into being. This does not mean there is no way to rectify this inadequacy. One can argue that this First Cause must now exist, since the only kind of being that can cause a contingent being (i.e., one that can come to be) is a Necessary Being.
A Necessary Being cannot come to be or cease to be. However, this borrows from the vertical cosmological argument to make up the lack in the horizontal cosmological argument. It might be easier just to begin with the vertical form.
The Argument and Deism-- Since the kalam argument as such does not prove that God is necessary to sustain the here-and-now existence of the universe, it has deistic tones. This does not mean that this argument denies the possibility of miracles, but it denies the ontological basis for God's immanence. A God who is not, as the horizontal cosmological argument shows he is, the here-and-now cause of the very existence of the universe, is deistically remote. The argument shows that God was needed to get the universe going, which is precisely what deists believe occurred. Again, this problem is not rectifiable unless one imports help from the vertical form of the cosmological argument, showing how a Necessary Being is necessary at all times to sustain all contingent beings at every moment of their existence.
The Argument and Pantheism -- Neither does the kalam argument disprove pantheism. In fact, it begs the question with pantheism by assuming the reality of the finite world. No pantheist would grant the premises that a finite, space-time world really exists and is actually running down, or that time is real, involving actual discrete units that pass in succession. Hence, the kalam argument is not effective in combating pantheism. What value to theism is an argument that eliminates neither deism or pantheism? There appears to be no solution that does not involve appeal to the vertical form of the cosmological argument. The vertical form of the cosmological argument would appear to be necessary to sustain the kalam argument.
No comments:
Post a Comment