Greg Koukl of Stand to Reason answers the question, "Why is Jesus the only way?" For more visit http://www.str.org.
Showing posts with label Apologetics-Theistic Arguments. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Apologetics-Theistic Arguments. Show all posts
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Saturday, March 15, 2008
A Wallet, A Dollar and the Existence of God
Three Steps Toward Christian Theism
From http://www.pleaseconvinceme.com
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A Wallet, A Dollar and the Existence of God-Part 2
“Even if we are convinced that the first appearance of life in the universe is best explained as the result of a ‘First Cause” Creator God from outside the natural realm, this still leaves us several options as to the NATURE of this God. Is this God personal? Isn’t it possible that the God who formed matter from non-matter and life from non-life may simply be some kind of impersonal force? After all, many world religions would suggest that this is the case.” 
“I believe that this creator God is a personal God based on His ability to DECIDE. Let me explain. Let’s return to our wallet for a second. What happens if I simply let go of the wallet? What forces are felt by the wallet? When I let go of this wallet, it immediately drops to the ground. Why does that happen? Why doesn’t it just float here for a minute and then drop to the ground when gravity DECIDES to act on it? Why don’t we EVER see that happen? You and I already know the answer! Gravity does not DECIDE to act at all! Gravity is an IMPERSONAL force, and it has been our experience that the EFFECT of an impersonal force is felt the minute that the force enters into the environment.”
“If we were floating around in a zero gravity environment (an imaginary room, for example) and we then inserted the force of gravity into this room, we would all immediately be pulled to the floor. The effect of the gravity is felt the minute gravity enters the room. That’s the way impersonal forces work. They can’t DECIDE whether or not they will activate their effect. Their impact is felt immediately; the minute the force enters the room. Gravity doesn’t enter the room and say, “Not yet, not yet, not yet… OK, now!” Gravity cannot DECIDE when its effect will be felt. It cannot DECIDE when it will act.” 
“See, the ability to DECIDE whether to act is a characteristic of ‘personhood’. The ability to move and act FREELY as a result of a conscious independent decision is a characteristic of free agency. It is a characteristic common to PERSONS, not impersonal forces. Does that make sense?”
“OK, so what does that tell you about the force that created the universe? Well, if it’s an impersonal force, then it can only be as old as the universe. In other words, the minute the impersonal force existed, its creative power was felt, and ‘bingo’ all space, time and matter also began. Remember our gravity example. The minute gravity appears, you feel its power. In a similar way, the minute an impersonal creative force appears, we would then observe its power in the creation of the universe. This means that the impersonal force would only be as old as the universe that was created as a result of its existence.”
“But wait a minute; if that is true, we have a dilemma! If the creative cause of the universe is only as old as the universe itself, then we must ask the obvious question, ‘Hey what caused THAT force to exist?’ Whatever caused the cause of the universe; THIS would then be the more powerful cause we would want to identify! Do you see the problem here? A true and singular first cause must be eternal by definition. In a very real sense, we innately know that whatever caused this ‘caused universe’ must be some kind of eternal first cause with the ability to DECIDE. Whatever caused this universe, it did so as a DECISION, and this ability to decide gives away the fact that the first cause of the universe is, in fact, a PERSONAL force.”
“I believe that PERSONAL THEISM is true because the first, uncaused cause of the universe was able to DECIDE as a personal agent.”
A Wallet, A Dollar and the Existence of God-Part 3
From http://www.pleaseconvinceme.com
Step Three: What Kind of Faith is Most Reasonable?
“If there is a God who is all-powerful and personal, it certainly makes sense that He might be concerned for the welfare of His personal creations. If he doesn’t care about us, why would he create us in the first place? If he had the choice NOT to create us (He could have decided otherwise), the fact that He chose to create us should give us good reason to think that He actually cares about us. Even the atheist has to explain WHY there is something here when there could easily be nothing here! It is reasonable to infer that a God who creates (when He doesn’t have to) would care about the condition of what He has created. A God like this would want to guide His creation toward true moral ‘goodness’, the kind of ‘goodness’ that would reflect His own character. After all, a being with this kind of incredible power (the power to decide to create the entire universe) would also have the power to eliminate imperfection, including moral imperfection. A God like this would be a PERFECT being.”
“It makes sense that a personal creator God would want his personal creations to understand and strive for the very values that are a reflection of his nature. It’s reasonable to assume that a personal God might present us with guidelines for living and then encourage us to live by these guidelines. And this is where we need to take some time to think about the nature of God. Let’s think about how God might reasonably expect us to live a truly moral life. Our human instinct is to create RULES that we can follow so that we can measure our success and judge how close we are to being ‘Godly’, but does a system of rules actually create a Godly person?”
“Now, you may have noticed that my wallet is still sitting on the ground. Imagine that I have a really bad back and I’m unable to bend over to pick up the wallet. I might ask you to pick it up for me, and if you did, this generous action on your part might be viewed as a morally good act. I might then find myself wanting to reward you by giving you the dollar that started this whole conversation.”
“But what if you knew in advance that I would give you the dollar as a reward if you would help me pick up the wallet? What if you ONLY picked up the wallet because you wanted that dollar? Would your actions still be seen as morally good, or would your greedy motive ruin the nature of the action? If you and I are only ‘being good’ so that we can EARN a prize, are we being truly ‘good’? If all my good actions were driven by my desire to get something in return, would we still call my actions ‘good’?”
“It seems to me that rules-based and works-based religious systems don’t actually produce ‘good’ people. They instead produce people who LOOK good. True goodness is a heart condition. It’s a reflection of who we are when no one is looking. It’s a reflection of our desire to do what’s right, even when there is nothing in it for us. It’s one thing to experience joy or satisfaction for doing what you know you ought to do; it’s another thing to do something ONLY because you are hoping to gain a prize. If we are only ‘performing’ because we are hoping to get the reward of ‘Salvation’, we’re merely trying to serve ourselves by earning a prize. On the other hand, if our hearts are so changed that we desire to behave morally even when the carrot of Salvation is not dangling in front of us, then we can say that we truly are ‘good’ people.”
“If you are looking for a spiritual worldview in which truly good people are even possible, you are going to have to look for one that does not REQUIRE good works. Now what religious worldview teaches that Salvation is NOT the result of anything that you can do, but is instead the result of something that has already been done for you by God Himself? There is only one; it is called Christianity. The Christian worldview teaches that Jesus came to pay the price for every ‘less than perfect’ thing you ever did; every sin and crime you’ve ever committed. God doesn’t judge us based on any good deed we might do, because our good deeds aren’t all that impressive if you really think about it. Instead, God accepts us on the basis of who JESUS is and the price that he paid for us if we will only believe in Him and trust HIM instead of ourselves. Good works are not REQUIRED for Salvation, even though they are typically the RESULT of our transformation. True moral goodness comes when we live and love in response to what has already been done for us, and not because we are hoping to win a prize.”
“I believe that CHRISTIAN THEISM is true because it best accounts for God’s desire to enable and encourage true moral behavior”
A Wallet, A Dollar and the Existence of God-Conclusion
From http://www.pleaseconvinceme.com
Conclusion: There Are Lot’s of Good Reasons
“So, I think there are some really good reasons to believe what I believe about God and the nature of His message to us. I am a Christian because:
(1) I believe that THEISM (the belief in an all-powerful first cause that is NOT part of the natural caused universe) best accounts for the appearance of our universe, and…
(2) I believe that PERSONAL THEISM best accounts for the nature of this ‘first cause’ and the fact that this cause had the ability to DECIDE to begin the universe, and…
(3) I believe that CHRISTIAN THEISM best accounts for the possibility of true moral goodness (something that a Personal God would desire for his creation)
In the end, the Christian Worldview best accounts for the reality we see in our universe and in our lives as moral beings. Could more be said about Christianity? Of course! We’ve only just begun! But in three short steps I hope I have at least placed Christianity in a position of rational consideration. I hope that I have at least given you some reason to stop and think twice about the truth of the Christian worldview…”
We hope that this simple visual presentation helps you to make a case for the existence of God and the reasonable nature of the Christian Worldview. We would like to provide you with some materials that can help you to utilize "A Wallet, A Dollar and the Existence of God" as you share the truth with others. We hope these resources are helpful!
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Friday, October 19, 2007
Leprechauns & God
From http://str.typepad.com
Christopher Hitchens accuses Christians of creating make-believe characters. Belief in God is like believing in leprechauns. Theism and leprechauns violate Occam's Razor, a kind of general principle that entities ought not be multiplies in explanations, at least none beyond what is necessary for the explanation. Hitchens is confident that materialism explains the universe; thus God is unnecessary, just as leprechauns. However, he's incorrect that materialism adequately explains the universe; and he's also wrong that God has no explanatory power. God isn't like leprechauns because these little green men don't explain anything.
Materialism can't account for the beginning of the universe or morality, two major questions crying for explanation. Various naturalistic theories attempt to get at the cause of the universe, how something came from nothing, but no theory is an adequate explanation and is actually philosophically unfeasible. Effects need causes and God is a reasonable and adequate cause for the beginning of the universe. William Lane Craig has advanced this argument best in the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
Morality is an unnatural, meaning nonmaterial, feature of the physical world. Just for starters, moralities universality and incumbency just find adequate explanations in science. The Moral Argument for God's existence has been advanced for centuries and scientific progress hasn't antiquated it.
Occam's Razor advises us to keep explanations simple. But it also guides us to multiply entities necessary to explain a phenomenon. Materialism is too simple because it fails to explain all that needs explanation. Leprechauns don't fill that role, but God does.Monday, January 01, 2007
Dismantling Implausibility Structures: The Argument from Fine-Tuning
By email: Joe Carter | @ http://www.evangelicaloutpost.com/archives/003355.html#more
[Note: This is the fourth post in the series examining the uses of theistic arguments in Christian apologetics.]
[Note: This is post four in the series, Dismantling Implausibility Structures: The Uses of Theistic Arguments.]
"The heavens tell of the glory of God," claimed the Psalmist, "The skies display his marvelous craftsmanship." The ancient musician intuited aesthetically what modern cosmology is able to show mathematically. The arrangement of natural laws and other features provides not only stirring examples of the handiwork of our Creator but provides us with a strong argument for His existence.
Teleological arguments are arguments from the order in the universe to the existence of God. One of the most persuasive yet least proffered arguments of this type is the argument based on the "fine-tuning" of the universe for the existence of life forms. At least two dozen demandingly exact physical constants must be in place for carbon-based life to exist (see list at end of post), The slightest variation in any of these conditions -- even to a minuscule degree -- would have rendered the universe unfit for the existence of any kind of life.
Such a remarkable set of "coincidences" surely demands an explanation. Indeed, as I hope to show, it can form the basis of one of the most sound teleological argument:
The apparent fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
The apparent fine-tuning is not due to physical necessity or design.
Therefore, it is due to design.
The first option, physical necessity, is the easiest to dismiss. The idea that it was physically impossible for the universe to have been created in any way other than in a manner that would support life is neither logically necessary nor scientifically plausible. Our options, therefore, are between chance and design. While it cannot be established with absolute certainty, we can, I believe, determine that design is the most probable explanation.
There is little dispute that probability of this series of "coincidences" occurring is infinitesimally small. Still, it is often argued that since we exist then the probability must be 1. In their book, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, John Barrow and Frank Tipler contend that we ought not be surprised at observing the universe to be as it is and that therefore no explanation of its fine-tuning is needed. In other words, we can only observe the need for fine-tuning in universes that support life.
Surprisingly, this dubious argument is often used as if it were a silver bullet that destroys the fine-tuning argument. But philosopher John Leslie (as told by William Lane Craig) provides an illustration of why such reasoning is faulty:
Suppose you are dragged before a firing squad of 100 trained marksmen, all of them with rifles aimed at your heart, to be executed. The command is given; you hear the deafening sound of the guns. And you observe that you are still alive, that all of the 100 marksmen missed! Now while it is true that
5. You should not be surprised that you do not observe that you are dead,nonetheless it is equally true that
6. You should be surprised that you do observe that you are alive.Since the firing squad's missing you altogether is extremely improbable, the surprise expressed in (6) is wholly appropriate, though you are not surprised that you do not observe that you are dead, since if you were dead you could not observe it. Similarly, while we should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our existence, it is nevertheless true that
7. We should be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with our existence,in view of the enormous improbability that the universe should possess such features.
Another problem I find with this line of thinking is that it implies that the probability of a stochastically independent event is determined by the existence of an observer. For example, imagine a universe that is exactly like ours yet contains no carbon-based life forms. We could determine the factors required for such an existence and calculate the probability of such constants appearing as they do. The result, of course, would be an infinitesimally small probability. The implication made by opponents of fine-tuning, though, is that the probability suddenly becomes 1 by the mere addition of a human observer. Such a conclusion is exceedingly absurd.
Most critics of fine-tuning have begun to recognize that this approach is insufficient. Faced with scientific evidence that undermines their agnostic assumptions, they turn to metaphysical speculation in the form of the "many worlds" theory.
Briefly stated, the many worlds theory is the hypotheses that if the universe contains an exhaustively random and infinite number of universes, then anything that can occur with non-vanishing probability will occur somewhere. True, the probability that our universe could develop in a way that supports life is incredibly small. But, these critics claim, in an infinite series of universes even the improbable is likely to happen quite often.
(It should be noted that there is no scientific evidence for this view (nor can there be since it is a metaphysical, rather than empirical, claim). and that it is merely an attempt to side-step the obvious implications of a designer by means of addition.)
Such a move, however, commits the inverse gambler�s fallacy, which states that an improbable event can be made less improbable by the hypothesis that many similar events exist, and that the hypothesis is thence confirmed by the improbable event. Even if multiple universe do exist, though, it does not change the probability that our universe would turn out as it did. Again, to use an illustration by John Leslie:
There is no need for us to ask whether very great alterations in these affairs would have rendered it fully possible once more, let alone whether physical worlds conforming to very different laws could have been observer-permitting without being in any way fine tuned. Here it can be useful to think of a fly on a wall, surrounded by an empty region. A bullet hits the fly. Two explanations suggest themselves. Perhaps many bullets are hitting the wall or perhaps a marksman fired the bullet. There is no need to ask whether distant areas of the wall, or other quite different walls, are covered with flies so that more or less any bullet striking there would have hit one. The important point is that the local area contains just the one fly.
Having reduced the chance hypothesis to a virtual impossibility we are left with the obvious conclusion that the fine-tuning is not only apparent but actual. The fine-tuning implies the existence of a tuner, hence we can conclude that the scientific evidence supports the conclusion that God exists.
As I have stated ad nauesum, the uses of such an argument are not to prove that God exists but to highlight the metaphysical and illogical knots that agnostically inclined will twist themselves into in order to avoid having to admit that the existence of God is more reasonable and probable than its alternative.
Sources: J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview
Notes: According to astrophysicist Hugh Ross, more than two dozen parameters for the universe must have values falling within narrowly defined ranges for life of any kind to exist.
1. Strong nuclear force constant
If larger: no hydrogen; nuclei essential for life would be unstable
If smaller: no elements other than hydrogen
2. Weak nuclear force constant
If larger: too much hydrogen converted to helium in big bang, hence too much heavy element material made by star burning; no expulsion of heavy elements from stars
If smaller: too little helium produced from big bang, hence too little heavy element material made by star burning; no expulsion of heavy elements from stars
3. Gravitational force constant
If larger: stars would be too hot and would burn up too quickly and too unevenly
If smaller: stars would remain so cool that nuclear fusion would never ignite, hence no heavy element production
4. Electromagnetic force constant
If larger: insufficient chemical bonding; elements more massive than boron would be too unstable for fission
If smaller: insufficient chemical bonding
5. Ratio of electromagnetic force constant to gravitational force constant
If larger: no stars less than 1.4 solar masses hence short stellar life spans and uneven stellar luminosities
If smaller: no stars more than 0.8 solar masses, hence no heavy element production
6. Ratio of electron to proton mass
If larger: insufficient chemical bonding
If smaller: insufficient chemical bonding
7. Ratio of numbers of protons to electrons
If larger: electromagnetism would dominate gravity, preventing galaxy, star, and planet formation
If smaller: electromagnetism would dominate gravity, preventing galaxy, star, and planet formation
8. Expansion rate of the universe
If larger: no galaxy formation
If smaller: universe would collapse prior to star formation
9. Entropy level of the universe
If smaller: no proto-galaxy formation
If larger: no star condensation within the proto-galaxies
10. Mass density of the universe
If larger: too much deuterium from big bang hence stars burn too rapidly
If smaller: insufficient helium from big bang, hence too few heavy elements forming
11. Velocity of light
If faster: stars would be too luminous
If slower: stars would not be luminous enough
12. Age of the universe
If older: no solar-type stars in a stable burning phase in the right part of the galaxy
If younger: solar-type stars in a stable burning phase would not yet have formed
13. Initial uniformity of radiation
If smoother: stars, star clusters, and galaxies would not have formed
If coarser: universe by now would be mostly black holes and empty space
14. Fine structure constant (a number used to describe the fine structure splitting of spectral lines)
If larger: DNA would be unable to function; no stars more than 0.7 solar masses
If smaller: DNA would be unable to function; no stars less than 1.8 solar masses
15. average distance between galaxies
if larger: insufficient gas would be infused into our galaxy to sustain star formation over an adequate time span
if smaller: the sun�s orbit would be too radically disturbed
16. average distance between stars
if larger: heavy element density too thin for rocky planets to form
if smaller: planetary orbits would become destabilized
17. decay rate of the proton
if greater: life would be exterminated by the release of radiation
if smaller: insufficient matter in the universe for life
18. 12Carbon (12C) to 16Oxygen (16O) energy level ratio
if larger: insufficient oxygen
if smaller: insufficient carbon
19. ground state energy level for 4Helium (4He)
if larger: insufficient carbon and oxygen
if smaller: insufficient carbon and oxygen
20. decay rate of 8Beryllium (8Be)
if slower: heavy element fusion would generate catastrophic explosions in all the stars
if faster: no element production beyond beryllium and, hence, no life chemistry possible
21. mass excess of the neutron over the proton
if greater: neutron decay would leave too few neutrons to form the heavy elements essential for life
if smaller: proton decay would cause all stars to collapse rapidly into neutron stars or black holes
22. initial excess of nucleons over anti-nucleons
if greater: too much radiation for planets to form
if smaller: not enough matter for galaxies or stars to form
23. polarity of the water molecule
if greater: heat of fusion and vaporization would be too great for life to exist
if smaller: heat of fusion and vaporization would be too small for life�s existence; liquid water would become too inferior a solvent for life chemistry to proceed; ice would not float, leading to a runaway freeze-up
24. supernovae eruptions
if too close: radiation would exterminate life on the planet
if too far: not enough heavy element ashes for the formation of rocky planets
if too frequent: life on the planet would be exterminated
if too infrequent: not enough heavy element ashes for the formation of rocky planets
if too late: life on the planet would be exterminated by radiation
if too soon: not enough heavy element ashes for the formation of rocky planets
25. white dwarf binaries
if too few: insufficient fluorine produced for life chemistry to proceed
if too many: disruption of planetary orbits from stellar density; life on the planet would be exterminated
if too soon: not enough heavy elements made for efficient fluorine production
if too late: fluorine made too late for incorporation in proto-planet
26. ratio of exotic to ordinary matter
if smaller: galaxies would not form
if larger: universe would collapse before solar type stars could form
Dismantling Implausibility Structures:Trueblood's Moral Argument
By email: Joe Carter | @ http://www.evangelicaloutpost.com/archives/003352.html#more
[Note: This is the third post in the series examining the uses of theistic arguments in Christian apologetics.]
Denying the reality of God is, I've often claimed, more a matter of the will and passions than of reason and intellect. But there is one argument for the existence of God that appeals to the will in a way that ontological or cosmological arguments are unable to do. Ironically, while those heady forms have been used since ancient times, the moral argument is a product of modernity.
The moral argument for the existence of God takes the simple form:
If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
Objective moral values exist.
Therefore, God exists.
The main premise -- objective moral values exist -- is almost always conceded in practice, even when it is denied in theory. A budding moral relativist may confidently claim in philosophy class that all morality is subjective. But let the professor flunk her based on that opinion and she will cry that she has been treated "unfairly" (and not just unfairly in a subjective sense either).
Moral arguments, therefore, have an intrinsic and intuitive appeal. Once we concede that morality is, in some sense, objective, we have to ponder where this objective standard emanates from. Several forms of the argument have been presented that attempt to build on that query. The moral argument presented by Immanuel Kant* is probably the most famous and the form posed by C.S. Lewis** is undoubtedly the most charming and popular. But the late Quaker theologian Elton Trueblood presents a most interesting variation of the argument:
1. There must be an objective moral law; otherwise: (a) There would not be such great agreement on its meaning. (b) No real moral disagreements would ever have occurred, each person being right from his own moral perspective. (c) No moral judgment would ever have been wrong, each being subjectively right. (d) No ethical question could ever be discussed, there being no objective meaning to any ethical terms. (e) Contradictory views would both be right, since opposites could be equally correct.
2. This moral law is beyond individual persons and beyond humanity as a whole: (a) It is beyond individual persons, since they often sense a conflict with it. (b) It is beyond humanity as a whole, for they collectively fall short of it and even measure the progress of the whole race by it.
3. This moral law must come from a moral Legislator because: (a) A law has no meaning unless it comes from a mind; only minds emit meaning. (b) Disloyalty makes no sense unless it is to a person, yet people die in loyalty to what is morally right. (c) Truth is meaningless unless it is a meeting of mind with mind, yet people die for the truth. (d) Hence, discovery of and duty to the moral law make sense only if there is a Mind or Person behind it.
4. Therefore, there must be a moral, personal Mind behind this moral law.
As philosopher Norma Geisler notes, the validity of Trueblood's argument is based in terms of its rationality. It argues that to reject the moral law is irrational or meaningless and unless we assume the universe is irrational, we must accept that there is an objective moral law and, thereby, an objective Moral Law Giver.
The easiest defense against this argument is to simply claim that the universe is irrational and meaningless. While some brave nihilist may actually make such an incoherent claim, it is not likely to be a popular approach. The next best option is to attack the crux of premise #3, that meaning comes from a mind and only minds emit meaning. I readily admit that I am not clever enough to find the flaw in that claim so I�ll leave it to better intellects to take up that task.
* Immanuel Kant's version:
1. The greatest good of all persons is that they have happiness in harmony with duty.
2. All persons should strive for the greatest good.
3. What persons ought to do, they can do.
4. But persons are not able to realize the greatest good in this life or without God.
5. Therefore, we must postulate a God and a future life in which the greatest good can be achieved.
(As Geisler points out, Kant never offered his postulate as a theoretical proof for God but rather viewed God�s existence as a morally necessary presupposition for morality.)
** C.S. Lewis's version:
1. There must be a universal moral law, or else: (a) Moral disagreements would make no sense, as we all assume they do. (b) All moral criticisms would be meaningless (e.g., "The Nazis were wrong."). (c) It is unnecessary to keep promises or treaties, as we all assume that it is. (d) We would not make excuses for breaking the moral law, as we all do.
2. But a universal moral law requires a universal Moral Law Giver, since the Source of it: (a) Gives moral commands (as lawgivers do). (b) Is interested in our behavior (as moral persons are).
3. Further, this universal Moral Law Giver must be absolutely good: (a) Otherwise all moral effort would be futile in the long run, since we could be sacrificing our lives for what is not ultimately right. (b) The source of all good must be absolutely good, since the standard of all good must be completely good.
4. Therefore, there must be an absolutely good Moral Law Giver.
Source: Geisler, N. L. Baker encyclopedia of Christian apologetics.
Dismantling Implausibility Structures:The Kalam Cosmological Argument
By email: Joe Carter | @ http://www.evangelicaloutpost.com/archives/003351.html#more
[Note: This is the second post in the series examining the uses of theistic arguments in Christian apologetics.]
[Note: This is the second post in the series examining the uses of theistic arguments in Christian apologetics.]
Cosmological arguments are theistic arguments that start from creation and work back to a Creator. They argue a posteriori, from effect to cause and are based on the principle of causality which states that every event has a cause, or that every thing that begins has a cause. One of the oldest incarnations of this form is known as the kalam cosmological argument.
Although the name was given by William Lane Craig, one of the most ardent of defenders of the argument, its history can be traced to Islamic philosophers such as Alfarabi, Al Ghazli, and Avicenna, and scholastic philosophers like Bonaventure. The argument was most famously opposed by Thomas Aquinas, who believed it philosophically possible (though biblically untrue) that God could have caused the universe from eternity.
The basic outline of the kalam argument is:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
The first premise is generally considered unobjectionable. Few atheists are willing to concede, as philosopher Quentin Smith once remarked, that "the most reasonable belief is that we came from nothing, by nothing, and for nothing." Most reasonable people refuse to accept that the universe sprang into existence uncaused out of nothing.
The second premise, therefore, is the heart of the argument and the point that must be defended. Historically, two philosophical and two scientific lines of evidence are generally given in support of this premise. As apologist Norman Geisler explains, the scientific evidence is based heavily on the Second Law of Thermodynamics which affirms that the universe is running out of usable energy and, hence, cannot be eternal. Other supportive evidence is taken from Big Bang cosmology, including the expanding universe and the purported radiation echo of the original explosion -- all of which are taken to support the idea of a beginning of the universe. For the purposes of this post, we'll ignore the scientific lines of argument since most people agree with the standard theories.
The two philosophical arguments share a similar approach. One is an argument from the impossibility of an actual infinite number of things. The other is an argument from the impossibility of forming an actually infinite collection of things by adding one member after another. While I consider the first argument to be more interesting, it's ability to persuade relies on an understanding of mathematical concepts such as infinity and set theory that are foreign to most people (including me).
The second argument, on the other hand, is more intuitive. If we accept that the converse of our second premise is true then we believe that the universe did not begin to exist, that it had no beginning. A series of events in time that has no beginning would be an actual infinite. In other words, if the series of past events had no beginning, it is actually infinite. An actual infinite, according to set theory, is a collection of things with an infinite number of members. One of the unique traits of an actual infinite is that part of an actually infinite set is equal to whole set. For example, in an actually infinite set of numbers, the number of even numbers in the set is equal to all of the numbers in the set. This follows because an infinite set of numbers contains an infinite number of even numbers as well as an infinite number of all numbers; hence a part of the set is equal to the whole of the set. Another trait of the actual infinite is that nothing can be added to it. Not one book can be added to an actually infinite library or one painting to an actually infinite museum.
The basic form of the second argument can therefore be outlined as:
1. The series of events in time is a collection formed by adding one member after another.
2. A collection formed by adding one member after another cannot be actually infinite.
3. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.
The primary point of contention with this argument would be that while an infinite collection cannot be formed by beginning at a point and adding members, it might be possible to create an infinite collection by never beginning but yet ending at a specific point. In other words, while the universe may not have had a beginning we could start at an ending point (i.e., the present) and count back toward eternity. Craig explains why this counter to the argument is implausible:
The idea of a beginningless series ending in the present seems to be absurd. To give just one illustration: suppose we meet a man who claims to have been counting from eternity and is now finishing: ..., -3, -2, -1, 0. We could ask, why did he not finish counting yesterday or the day before or the year before? By then an infinite time had already elapsed, so that he should have finished by then. Thus, at no point in the infinite past could we ever find the man finishing his countdown, for by that point he should have already be done! In fact, no matter how far back into the past we go, we can never find the man counting at all, for at any point we reach he will have already finished. But if at no point in the past do we find him counting this contradicts the hypothesis that he has been counting from eternity. This illustrates the fact that the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition is equally impossible whether one proceeds to or from infinity.
Assuming these arguments are convincing, we are can conclude that the universe began to exist. The next set of questions that remain are whether the entity that caused the universe to come into existence was either natural or non-natural and either personal or non-personal.
The first set appears to be the easiest to resolve. Since "natural causes" are causes which exist within the universe, not outside of it, any cause that preceded the creation of the universe must be, by definition, non-natural (or, if you prefer, supernatural). The second set is a bit trickier, and is contingent on whether the cause of the universe was sufficient (meaning that the existence of the cause alone guarantees the existence of the universe) or whether the cause had to be set in motion by a rational (hence, personal) agent.
An example of how to think about the answer is provided by Bill Ramsey:
To make this clear consider the sufficient cause of lighting a match. When a match is struck against the proper surface, it ignites, and thus striking the match is the sufficient cause of an ignited match. Note that as soon as a sufficient cause exists, the effect follows immediately; there is no gap between the cause and the effect. This raises a question: if the sufficient cause of the universe has always existed, then why has the universe not always existed?The answer to this question is that the cause of the universe is a personal agent who willed the creation of a finite universe. To use the match example, once the match is struck the effect immediately follows, but if a personal agent does not strike the match, the effect does not have to follow. Likewise, if the cause of the universe is personal, the universe does not have to be eternal like its sufficient cause. Instead, the universe could have been willed into existence much like a person wills to light a match. Once the cause is set into motion the effect follows, but only after the cause is set into motion; and a personal agent has the power not to set the cause in motion. Thus we can conclude that the cause of the universe is personal.
Incorporating the elements into a whole, we can conclude that the universe was caused to come into existence at a finite point in time by a rational, personal Being. This conclusion, while not indisputable, certainly presents one more reasonable argument why it is more likely than not that God exists. It increases the plausibility that theism is true and atheism is false. Unfortunately, kalam, like all arguments for natural theology, can only drop us off at the door of theism. Special revelation is required to carry us up the steps and inside the inner sanctum where God reveals himself -- specifically in the form of Jesus Christ.
See also:
- William Lane Craig, "Initial Arguments: A Defense of the Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God"
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Cosmological Argument
The following is a list of the most significant criticisms that have been offered against the kalam argument, with responses by proponents of the argument. This list was taken, with slight modification, from the Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics and is included as reference for presenting a more thorough argument:
Eternal Eventless Universe -- Some suggest that big bang only signals the first eruption in a previously eternal universe. That is, the universe had eternal quiescence before this first event. The big bang singularity only marks the transition from primal physical stuff. Hence, there is no need for a Creator to make something out of nothing.
No known natural laws could account for this violent eruption out of eternal quietude. Some theists assert that an eternally quiet universe is physically impossible, since it would have to exist at absolute zero, which is impossible. Matter at the beginning was anything but cold, being collapsed into a fireball with temperatures in excess of billions of degrees Kelvin. In a lump of matter frozen to absolute zero, no first event could occur. Finally, positing eternal primordial stuff does nothing to account for the incredible order that follows the moment of the big bang. Only an intelligent Creator can account for this.
Rebounding Universe -- Some scientists have suggested that the Big Bang may only be the most recent in an eternal process of expansion and collapse. There are several problems with this hypothesis. There is no real scientific evidence for this speculation. It contradicts the Second Law, which would demand that, even if the universe were expanding and contracting, it would still be running down, so that it would ultimately collapse anyway. Logically and mathematically, the evidence for the Big Bang suggests that originally there was no space, no time, and no matter. Hence, even if the universe were somehow going through expansion and contraction from this point on, at the beginning it came into existence from nothing. This would still call for an initial Creator.
Steady State Theory -- Fred Hoyle devised the steady-state theory to avoid the need to posit a first cause. According to this hypothesis, hydrogen atoms are spontaneously coming into existence to keep the universe from running down. If so, then it would not need a beginning, since it is not running out of usable energy. There are, however, two serious problems with this speculation. First, there is no scientific evidence that hydrogen atoms are coming into existence. This has never been observed anywhere. Second, the belief that hydrogen atoms are coming into existence out of nothing is itself ex nihilo creation. It does not explain what (or Who) is creating them. Indeed, it is contrary to the fundamental principle of science (and rational thought) that everything that comes to be had a cause.
No Need for a Cause -- Some atheists argue that there is nothing incoherent about something coming into existence from nothing. They insist that the universe could come into existence "by nothing and from nothing." Proponents of the kalam argument offer several points in response. First, this is contrary to the established principle of causality. It is contrary to the scientific enterprise, which seeks a causal explanation. It is counterintuitive to believe that things just pop into existence. Many argue that the idea that nothing can cause something is logically incoherent, since "nothing" has no power to do anything--it does not even exist.
An Infinite Series -- Some thinkers believe an infinite number of moments is possible, since in mathematics infinite series are possible. For example, an infinite number of points exists between the ends of my ruler. In response to this objection, proponents of the kalam argument insist that there is a difference between a mathematical infinite series and an actual infinite series. Mathematical series are abstract, but actual series are concrete. In a concrete series it is impossible to have an infinite number, since no matter how long it is one more can always be added. But this would make it more than infinitely long, which is impossible. Further, that one can get an infinite number of abstract (dimensionless) points between the book ends on my desk does not mean one can get an infinite number of books (or even sheets of paper) between them, no matter how thin they are.
Others object that if God knows the future, which is endless, then he knows an infinite series of events. And if he knows it, then it must be possible no matter how contrary to our intuitions it may be. But defenders point out that the future is not an actual infinite series but only a potential one, there always being the possibility of one more event. Further, if an actual infinite series is impossible, then God cannot know it, since God cannot know the impossible, only the actual and the possible.
No Personal God -- Some have objected that the kalam argument does not prove God is personal or intelligent. Hence, it is not helpful to Christian theism which believes in an intelligent Creator. In response, some theists argue that only a being with free choice could bring something from nothing. Also, few theists believe that the cosmological argument alone proves a theistic God. It must be combined with the teleological argument and/or moral argument to show that God is also intelligent and moral. Second, some proponents of the kalam argument offer arguments for the personality of the First Cause, apart from the teleological or moral arguments. Three have been suggested.
The argument from a First Cause can be stated:
1. The universe had a First Cause.
2. This First Cause's act to create was either determined, undetermined, or self-determined.
3. But it cannot be determined, since there is nothing before the First Cause.
4. Neither can it be undetermined, since this is contrary to the principle of causality.
5. Hence, the act to create must have been self-determined.
6. But self-determined acts are free acts, for this is what is meant by a free act.
7. Therefore, the act by which the First Cause created the world must have been a free act of an intelligent, personal being.
The argument from the nature of intellectual causes can be stated:
1. An intelligent cause is characterized by effects which have ordered, regular effects.
2. According to the anthropic principle the universe was "fine tuned" or "pre-fitted" from the very moment of its big bang origin for the eventual emergence of human life. The most infinitesimal change of conditions in any way would have made life as we know it impossible.
3. Therefore, the First Cause must have been an intelligent cause.
The argument from the nature of natural causes states that natural causes have certain characteristics not present prior to the moment of the creation of the universe. The argument can be stated:
1. Natural causes have predetermined conditions.
2. But there were not predetermined conditions before the moment of the big bang origin of the space-time universe.
3. Therefore, the Cause was not a natural cause; it must have been a non-natural cause without predetermined conditions.
4. The only known cause which has these characteristics is a free cause.
5. Hence, the First Cause was a free cause.
Limits to the Argument -- The Argument and God's Continued Existence -- Three objections have more validity than others. They do not invalidate what the kalam argument demonstrates, but they show its severe limitations. This argument cannot prove that any God now exists. Therefore, it cannot disprove deism. Further, its assumptions are unacceptable to a pantheist, so it is useless against pantheism.
The kalam argument as such does not prove that any God now exists or necessarily exists. It is an argument about how the universe originated, not how it is sustained. It shows that a First Cause was needed to explain how the universe came into being. This does not mean there is no way to rectify this inadequacy. One can argue that this First Cause must now exist, since the only kind of being that can cause a contingent being (i.e., one that can come to be) is a Necessary Being.
A Necessary Being cannot come to be or cease to be. However, this borrows from the vertical cosmological argument to make up the lack in the horizontal cosmological argument. It might be easier just to begin with the vertical form.
The Argument and Deism-- Since the kalam argument as such does not prove that God is necessary to sustain the here-and-now existence of the universe, it has deistic tones. This does not mean that this argument denies the possibility of miracles, but it denies the ontological basis for God's immanence. A God who is not, as the horizontal cosmological argument shows he is, the here-and-now cause of the very existence of the universe, is deistically remote. The argument shows that God was needed to get the universe going, which is precisely what deists believe occurred. Again, this problem is not rectifiable unless one imports help from the vertical form of the cosmological argument, showing how a Necessary Being is necessary at all times to sustain all contingent beings at every moment of their existence.
The Argument and Pantheism -- Neither does the kalam argument disprove pantheism. In fact, it begs the question with pantheism by assuming the reality of the finite world. No pantheist would grant the premises that a finite, space-time world really exists and is actually running down, or that time is real, involving actual discrete units that pass in succession. Hence, the kalam argument is not effective in combating pantheism. What value to theism is an argument that eliminates neither deism or pantheism? There appears to be no solution that does not involve appeal to the vertical form of the cosmological argument. The vertical form of the cosmological argument would appear to be necessary to sustain the kalam argument.
Dismantling Implausibility Structures: The Uses of Theistic Arguments
By Joe Carter @ http://www.evangelicaloutpost.com/archives/003350.html#more
[Note: Regular posting will resume next Monday. This week I’ll be reexamining the uses of theistic arguments in Christian apologetics.]
"Can you prove God exists?"
Although I've been asked that question hundreds of times since I became a Christian, how I've answered has varied considerably over the years. When I was young I would defer, claiming that while I couldn't perform such a feat myself, other more knowledgeable Christians could present such proofs. As my confidence in my apologetic skills grew, my response became a resoundingly eager, "Of course." Years of being proven wrong, however, transformed my answer into a more humble, "no."
Now, however, if asked I have a more nuanced reply: I can certainly provide rational arguments for God's existence -- whether they are convincing on an individual level is another matter. I've come to realize that the problem lies not with the arguments but with the nature of belief itself. Belief in God, like almost all beliefs, can be rationally avoided. Skeptics can always find reasons, however implausible they might be, for refusing to concede that God exists.
Are we to conclude that theological arguments are therefore useless? Certainly not. For while they will not convince those whose passions rule their reason and prevent them from facing the truth, such arguments can be useful for shoring up a individual's or a society's plausibility structures.
Everything that we believe is filtered through our plausibility structures -- belief-forming apparatus that acts as a gatekeeper, letting in evidence that is matched against what we already consider to be possible. For example, if I were to find a box of cookies in my kitchen cabinet I would assume that my wife had bought them at the store and placed them there herself. If someone were to argue that tree-dwelling elves baked the cookies, packaged them for their corporate employer, and stashed them in my pantry, I would have a difficult time believing their claim; the existence of unionized tree-dwelling elves is simply not a part of my plausibility structure.
Plausibility structures can prevent us from forming beliefs that are inconsistent with experience and evidence. But they can also have a negative impact, preventing us from forming true beliefs about reality. This appears to be the case within a broad segment of modern science. By accepting a plausibility structure that is limited to purely naturalistic explanations, many in the scientific community have imposed self-limiting and irrational criteria for explaining reality. The same is true for the small segment of atheists who truly believe that it is implausible that God exists.
Oddly enough, while atheism is a minority view and has been so throughout the history of the world, it is assumed that pluralism requires that we adopt it as the default plausibility structure for almost all areas of human culture. Everything from science and education to politics and public policy is assumed to begin with the assumption that either God does not exist or that his existence is irrelevant. This idea that soft atheism is the neutral ground from which all sectarian matters must be addressed is patently absurd. Not only does this claim fail to recognize that atheism is not religiously neutral, it fails to acknowledge that atheism is quite implausible.
It is this implausibility that needs to be continuously pointed out and brought into the open. Theological arguments aid in this effort by pointing out that belief in the existence of God is more probable, more plausible, more reasonable, and more rational than its denial. While we should be respectful of individuals who adhere to skepticism or atheism, when these beliefs are brought to the public square their mystical and improbably assumption should receive the utmost scrutiny.
The use of these arguments does not require that Christians become full-time apologists. All that is required is a basic knowledge of their structure and an understanding of their strengths and weaknesses. Whether they are directly useful in leading unbelievers to Christ, they can be indirectly useful in reshaping the plausibility structures of our culture.
Next: Cosmological Arguments (A general pattern of argumentation that makes an inference from certain alleged facts about the world (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally referred to as God.)
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