Logical and Rhetorical Forms Index

From Joe Carter @ http://www.evangelicaloutpost.com

Figures of Reasoning

A Fortiori -- "To the stronger," or "even more so. " We are bound to accept an a fortiori claim because of our prior acceptance of a weaker application of the same reasoning or truth.

• Matthew 18:12-14 -- The Greatest Pursuits
  
• Luke 13:10-17 -- Rebecca Writes
  
• Luke 15 -- The Greatest Pursuits
  
• John 18:33-38 -- Allthings2all
  
• Mt. 7:7-11 and Luke 11:5-11 -- A Physicist's Perspective
  
• Luke 6:1-5 -- Rebecca Writes

Aetiologia -- A figure of reasoning by which one attributes a cause for a statement or claim made.

• John 18:33-38 -- Allthings2all

Anthypophora -- A figure of reasoning in which one asks and then immediately answers one's own questions.

• Luke 4:14-32 -- The Crusty Curmudgeon
  
• Mark 2:18-22 -- Citizen Z
  
• Luke 15 -- The Greatest Pursuits

Appeal to Authority

• Wittenberg Gate, "Jesus the Logician: Appeals to Authority"

Appeal to Evidence

• John 5:18-47 -- The Bible Archive

Anacephalaeosis -- A recapitulation of the facts.

• John 6:63-65 -- The Bible Archive

Apophasis -- The rejection of several reasons why a thing should or should not be done and affirming a single one, considered most valid.

Argument from Analogy

• 21:28-32 -- Parableman

Commoratio -- Dwelling on or returning to one's strongest argument.

Contrarium -- Juxtaposing two opposing statements in such a way as to prove the one from the other.

Dirimens copulatio -- A figure by which one balances one statement with a contrary, qualifying statement.

Enthymeme -- The informal method of reasoning typical of rhetorical discourse. A truncated syllogism.

• Mark 2: 1-12 -- Citizen Z
  
• Matthew 10:40-42 -- Parableman

Expeditio -- After enumerating all possibilities by which something could have occurred, the speaker eliminates all but one.

False Dilemma

• Mark 12:18-27; Matt 22:23-34; Luke 20:27-40 -- Parableman
  
• John 9:1-3 -- Parableman
  
• 8:3-11 -- ...in the outer...

Non-contradiction

• Jollyblogger, "Jesus and the Law of Non-Contradiction"

Paromologia -- Admitting a weaker point in order to make a stronger one.

• Mark 12:18-27; Matt 22:23-34; Luke 20:27-40 -- Parableman
  
• Mark 2:13-17 -- Citizen Z

Proecthesis -- When, in conclusion, a justifying reason is provided.

Prosapodosis -- Providing a reason for each division of a statement, the reasons usually following the statement in parallel fashion.

Ratiocinatio -- Reasoning (typically with oneself) by asking questions.

Reductio ad absurdum -- is a type of logical argument where we assume a claim for the sake of argument, arrive at an absurd result, and then conclude the original assumption must have been wrong, since it gave us this absurd result.

• Mark 12:18-27; Matt 22:23-34; Luke 20:27-40 -- Parableman

Sorites -- A chain of claims and reasons which build upon one another. Concatenated enthymemes.

• Matthew 9:2-7, Mark 2:3-12, Luke 5:18-25 -- The Greatest Pursuits
  
• Mark 2:18-22 -- Citizen Z

Syllogismus --The use of a remark or an image which calls upon the audience to draw an obvious conclusion.

• John 3:14-18 -- The Bible Archive

Figures of Ethos

Anamnesis -- Calling to memory past matters. More specifically, citing a past author from memory. Anamnesis helps to establish ethos, since it conveys the idea that the speaker is knowledgeable of the received wisdom from the past.

• Matthew 4:1-10 -- RazorsKiss

*****

Antithesis

• Matthew 22:15-22 -- The Wardrobe Door

Elenchus

• Matthew 12:22-29 -- The Wardrobe Door

Erotema

• John 14:8-11 -- The Wardrobe Door

Procatalepsis

• Luke 7:36-50 -- The Wardrobe Door

___________________________________________________________________

Aetiologia -- A figure of reasoning by which one attributes a cause for a statement or claim made.

"I mistrust not the judges, for they are just."

"So, as much as in me is, I am ready to preach the gospel to you that are at Rome also. For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek." -- Romans 1:15-16

Anthypophora -- A figure of reasoning in which one asks and then immediately answers one's own questions.

"But there are only three hundred of us," you object. Three hundred, yes, but men, but armed, but Spartans, but at Thermoplyae: I have never seen three hundred so numerous." -- Seneca

Apophasis -- The rejection of several reasons why a thing should or should not be done and affirming a single one, considered most valid.

"Seeing that this land was mine, you must show that either you did possess it, being empty, or made it your own by use, or purchase, or else that it came to you by inheritance. You could not possess it empty when I was in possession. Also, you cannot make it your by use or custom. You have no deed to prove your purchase of it; I being alive it could not descend upon you by inheritance. It follows then that you would put me from my own land before I am dead." -- John Smith

Commoratio -- Dwelling on or returning to one's strongest argument.

Contrarium -- Juxtaposing two opposing statements in such a way as to prove the one from the other.

"Are we afraid to fight those on the plains whom we have hurled down from the hills?"

Dirimens copulatio -- A figure by which one balances one statement with a contrary, qualifying statement.

Enthymeme -- The informal method of reasoning typical of rhetorical discourse. A truncated syllogism.

"We cannot trust this man, for he has perjured himself in the past."
In this enthymeme, the major premise of the complete syllogism is missing:

Those who perjure themselves cannot be trusted. (Major premise - omitted)

This man has perjured himself in the past. (Minor premise - stated)

This man is not to be trusted. (Conclusion - stated)

Expeditio -- After enumerating all possibilities by which something could have occurred, the speaker eliminates all but one.

"You either made, purchased, or stole the bomb. Since you lack the intelligence to make it and the funds to purchase it, it can only be that you have stolen it."

Paromologia -- Admitting a weaker point in order to make a stronger one.

Proecthesis -- When, in conclusion, a justifying reason is provided.

"I will have mercy, and not sacrifice: for I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance." -- Matt. 9:13

Prosapodosis -- Providing a reason for each division of a statement, the reasons usually following the statement in parallel fashion.

"Yes, I may have been a petty thief, but I am no felon."

The Syllogisms of Seinfeld: The Connections Between Logic and Humor

By Joe Carter @ http://www.evangelicaloutpost.com

There is more logic in humor than in anything else. Because, you see, humor is truth. -- Victor Borge

At first glance it might appear that humor and logic belong to completely separate spheres. Humor is playful, lively, and unbounded by procedural standards. Logic, in contrast, is serious, strict, and completely circumscribed by rules and processes. Humor is tied to emotion while logic is above such non-rational ephemera. Comedians aren't often known for their critical thinking skills and Mr. Spock -- the Vulcan embodiment of cool logic -- wasn't known for his jokes. But in an article for Philosophy Now, Julia Nefsky argues that logic has a very real and very important role in humor:

The range of humour in which there is logic and logical fallacy is huge. By logic and fallacy being in humour I mean that there is some logic or fallacy there that is necessary to what makes it funny. In other words, if you hypothetically removed that logic or fallacy, the joke would not work. You'll find logic and logical fallacies in all kinds of humorous works, including those of Shakespeare, Lewis Carroll, Monty Python, the Marx Brothers, Abbott and Costello, Woody Allen, Mel Brooks, Steve Martin, Stephen Leacock, Douglas Adams, and even television shows like Beavis and Butthead. Also, logic and fallacies are used in many different comics, including Garfield, Calvin and Hobbes, and Peanuts. And there are lots of great examples in the work of stand-up comedians like Jerry Seinfeld, Bill Cosby, George Carlin, and Henny Youngman. In fact, basically everywhere you look in humour there will be some bits in which logic or fallacy is used in a significant way - sometimes just a couple can be found, and other times they are all over the place!

Every time logic or a fallacy is used in humour it serves a specific role. I have found that a convenient way of classifying examples is in terms of three roles that seem to cover all the significant ways logic and fallacy are used in humour: essence, enhancer, and mechanism.

In the article, Nefsky explains each of these terms and provides examples of how they are used. Although she provides adequate illustrations, I've taken the liberty of using her roles but replacing the examples with ones from episodes of Seinfeld.

Roles of Essence -- The logic or fallacy used serves as the essence of what makes it funny. In these cases other aspects might enhance the humor, but the logic or fallacy is precisely what makes it funny, such that without it there is no humor left.

Type #1 -- Equivocation: the name of the most common informal fallacy used in humor and usually it is the essence of what is funny. Equivocation occurs when two different meanings or senses of the same word(s) are used as if equivalent. In humor equivocation is often played out with two people - where one person says something implying one meaning and the other person takes it as if another meaning was intended.

"I wanted to talk to you about Dr. Whatley. I have a suspicion that he's converted to Judaism purely for the jokes."
"And this offends you as a Jewish person?"
"No, it offends me as a comedian."
- Jerry and Father Curtis, in "The Yada Yada"

"You are still afraid? You are not a man."
"Well, then what are all those ties and sports jackets doing in my closet?"
- Gina and Jerry, in "The Suicide"

"I still can't believe you're going out on a blind date."
"I'm not worried. It sounds like he's really good looking."
"You're going by sound? What are we, whales?"
- Jerry and Elaine, in "The Wink"

"Wait. Those are the clothes from the bag!"
"The guy never came back."
"He asked you to watch them, not wear them."
"I'm still watching them."
- Jerry and George, in "The Muffin Tops"

Type #2 -- Contradiction -- One thing in logic that is often used in humor and that usually serves the role of essence is known as contradiction or absurdity. This occurs when contradictory statements are given or implied, producing a nonsensical, absurd situation. In terms of formal logic, this is like having both "A" and "not A" (where A could be substituted with anything). In formal logic having both "A" and "not A" simultaneously is considered always false, or as some logicians say: absurd.

"What if something happens?"
"What could happen?"
"What if it felt good?"
"It's supposed to feel good."
"I don't want it to feel good."
"Then why get the massage?"
"Exactly!"
- George, discussing a massage given by a male masseuse, with Elaine, in "The Note"

Type #3 -- False Cause -- There is an informal fallacy called False Cause that is used in humor and that often has the role of essence. False Cause happens when it is assumed that simply because A has preceded B, that A has caused B.

"No doctors for me. A bunch of lackeys and yes-men all towing the company line. Plus, they botched my vasectomy."
"They botched it?"
"I'm even more potent now!"
- Kramer and Jerry, in "The Andrea Doria"

The Role of Enhancer -- the logic or fallacy adds to the essence of what is funny to make it even funnier.

Type #1 -- Hasty Generalizations -- occurs when a generalization is made from too few cases or, as often seen in humor, when the generalization is obviously not true as a literal statement (a clear exaggeration).

"So, what you are saying is that ninety to ninety-five percent of the population is undateable?"
"Undateable!"
"Then how are all these people getting together?"
"Alcohol."
- Elaine and Jerry, in "The Wink"

"What is it about sex that just disrupts everything? Is it the touching? Is it the nudity?"
"It can't be the nudity. I never got into these terrible fights and misunderstandings when I was changing before gym class."
- George and Jerry, in "The Deal"

"All bald people look good in hats."
"You should have lived in the twenties and thirties, you know men wore hats all the time then."
"What a bald paradise that must have been. Nobody knew."
- George and Elaine, in "The Parking Spot"

The Role of Mechanism -- the logic or fallacy is what gets you from one thought to another. When formal logic takes on the role of mechanism, valid logic is used to get the reader or audience to make a certain inference from one idea to another.

"Well, behind every joke there's some truth."
"What about that Bavarian cream pie joke I told you? There's no truth to that. Nobody with a terminal illness goes from the United States to Europe for a piece of Bavarian cream pie and then when they get there and they don't have it he says, 'Ah, I'll just have some coffee.' There's no truth to that."
- Sheila and Jerry, in "The Soup Nazi"

"God would never let me be successful. He'd kill me first. He'll never let me be happy."
"I thought you didn't believe in God?"
"I do for the bad things."
- George and his therapist, in "The Pilot"

"I've been lying about my income for a few years. I figured I could afford a fake house in the Hamptons."
- George, in "The Wizard"

"What are you saying?"
"I'm not saying anything."
"You're saying something."
"What could I be saying?"
"Well, you're not saying nothing. You must be saying something."
"If I was saying something, I would've said it."
"Why don't you say it?"
"I said it."
"What'd you say?"
"Nothing."
- Jerry and Elaine, in "The Red Dot"

"It's a write-off for them."
"How is it a write-off?"
"They just write it off."
"Write it off what?"
"Jerry, all these big companies, they write off everything."
"You don't even know what a write-off is."
"Do you?"
"No, I don't."
"But they do. And they're the ones writing it off."
"I wish I had the last twenty seconds of my life back."
- Kramer and Jerry, in "The Package"

Moral Argument III: The Euthyphro Dilemma

Posted by Jeremy @http://parablemania.ektopos.com/archives/2006/11/moralarg3.html#more

This is the the twenty-fifth post in my Theories of Knowledge and Reality series. Follow the link for more on the series and for links to other entries as they appear. In the last post, I looked at why some people think theism serves as the best non-naturalistic foundation for ethics. This post now looks at an objection to seeing God as the basis of morality.

In Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, he has the character of Socrates raise an objection to the idea that morality has something to do with the gods. If something is good just because the gods view it as good, the gods could command anything, and it would automatically be right. You don't have to be a polytheist for that consequence. How could God's mere choice be the basis of morality? Are good things good because God says they're good, or does God just declare them good based on seeing their goodness? If they are already good, then doesn't that mean God's choice didn't make them good?

Many theists are attracted to the thesis that God simply decides what is morally good. But that seems arbitrary. God could have declared murder to be good, and that would have made it good, on this view. Most theists don't want to say that once they consider it. Also, this view also doesn't explain why it's meaningful to praise God. If anything God does, no matter what it is, is automatically good, then why is it saying anything if we praise God for being good? Third, this view doesn't explain why God would say certain things are good and not others. If all that makes it good is the fact that God chose it, then God isn't choosing it for any reasons. Do we want to say that God acts without rationally compelling reasons? Do we want to say that there is no explanation at all for why God chose these things to be good? If we say that, then we really haven't explained morality at all, have we? If any choice at all would be good just because God says so, that leads to these unwelcome consequences. So it must be that what makes them good is not God's mere choice.

So maybe God just declares things to be right and wrong out of seeing that those truths are true in a way independent of God. If so, it seems to be an external limitation on God, who isn't supposed to have such limitations. Morality would give God obligations, and thus would be external to God. Many theists would be uncomfortable with that. Also, this doesn't allow the moral argument to get going to begin with, since the moral truths would have to be independent from God. God's nature doesn't explain them after all. This second option is not the way to go to defend the moral argument against the Euthyphro objection.

Most contemporary philosophers stop there and just conclude that God cannot be the basis of morality. The moral argument suddenly becomes a ridiculous non-starter in the eyes of most philosophers I know, pretty much entirely because of this objection. But anyone presenting the objection and stopping there betrays a severe ignorance of how this question was treated by one of the most well-known and influential of all theistic philosophers. Thomas Aquinas gives a response to Plato's objection that avoids both of the above problems, and unfortunately very few philosophers nowadays even seem to know about his response.

Aquinas' suggestion is to give a third option: God's perfect nature explains morality. If so, then moral truths aren't external to God after all, so there's no external limitation. Also, the moral argument isn't immediately defeated, since God’s nature does the explaining. Third, it's not as if God just chooses out of lots of options what is good or evil, so it's not arbitrary. Its foundation is God's nature, something essential to being a perfect being. Aquinas' view avoids the problems of the two options of the dilemma while still providing a foundation for morality. So it seems the Euthyphro objection does not undermine the conclusion of the moral argument.

Next: The Logical Problem of Evil

Shall We Reason Together? Part Nine: The Problem of Premises

By Kevin T. Bauder at http://www.sharperiron.org/2006/11/14/shall-we-reason-together-part-nine-the-problem-of-premises/#more-894

All cats are dogs.

All dogs are quadrupeds.

Therefore, all cats are quadrupeds.

We merely have to glance at the above syllogism to know that something is wrong—but what? It is formally valid. The conclusion is actually true. When we examine the minor premise, however, we discover that this premise is false. The argument is unsound, and consequently its conclusion does not compel us. Though the conclusion happens to be true, it is true “by accident.” In other words, its truth has nothing to do with the argument itself.

No argument, however valid, can be sound unless it reasons from true premises. No conclusion, however necessary, can be compelling if it has been inferred from premises that are false or even questionable. In other words, the usefulness of a logical inference is always limited by the truth-value of its premises. Even when logic is functioning flawlessly, a false premise will always yield a worthless conclusion.

The problem is that logic, in and of itself, is never adequate to establish the truth of the premises. Logical arguments always begin with something that is “given,” and where nothing is given, no conclusions can be drawn. Without some prior assumption or information, even the most rational beings would have nothing to reason about. C. S. Lewis pictures this situation famously in his allegory, The Pilgrim’s Regress. [Incidentally, this is one of the books that every collegian ought to read.] In that allegory, the protagonist is rescued from the Spirit of the Age (pictured as a giant) by Reason, who is depicted as a sun-bright woman on a black horse. She slays the Spirit of the Age by pointing out the self stultifying nature of his arguments. When the protagonist begs her for positive direction, however, she replies, “I can tell you only what you know. I can bring things out of the dark part of your mind into the light part of it.” Reason by itself cannot carry one forward. Lewis’s metaphor for this limitation is that “Reason is a virgin.”

Where do premises come from? Sometimes they are sheer assumptions or even fabrications. Sometimes they are given by tradition, custom, “common knowledge,” experience, or expert authority. Often they rely upon inductive observations. Wherever they come from, however, premises must be true before deductions drawn from them can be trusted.

At first glance, it might appear that this limitation would not affect conclusions drawn by valid arguments from Scripture. Since the Bible is inerrant, everything that the Bible affirms is true. Therefore, any conclusion necessarily arising from biblical affirmations must be true, right?

Right—but only as long as the premises really are biblical affirmations. We must be sure that what we assert as a premise is really what the Bible affirms. Very often, it is not.

I have pointed out more than once that we read the Bible inductively. All of our understanding of Scripture arises from the analytical and inductive work of the mind as we read. Since inductions never yield epistemological certainty, all of our biblical understanding occurs at the level of probability. Sometimes the degree of probability is so high as to approach certainty asymptotically, but it remains probability. Sometimes the degree of probability is lower—much lower. Sometimes our assertions about what the Bible says are actually improbable, and sometimes they are even implausible.

Reasoning from Scripture involves a process of alternating between inductions and deductions. This process is sometimes called abduction or retroduction. In order to draw deductive conclusions, we must first have premises, and those premises are usually supplied inductively. As a rule, we are not in a position to draw necessary inferences from biblical premises until we have drawn more-or-less probable inferences about what the Bible actually says.

This method is not a problem as long as we recognize its limitations. Given true premises, a valid deduction will yield true conclusions. When an element of uncertainty is introduced into the premises, however, the certainty of the conclusion has to suffer. To the degree that premises are less certain, any inference (however necessary) will also be less certain. If a premise contains error, then the conclusion cannot be trusted. As with computers, so with arguments: Garbage In, Garbage Out.

Generally, our problem is not so much that we are too confident in the validity of our inferences as that we overrate the probability of our premises. We rely upon terms that we have not carefully defined. We leap to hasty generalizations. We overvalue some premises because of emotional involvement or vested interest. We allow ourselves to be persuaded by the popularity of a premise, mistaking wide acceptance for self-evidence. We become enamored with a premise because of the authority or likeability of some person who advances it—or else we permit our dislike of our opponents to color our evaluation of the assertions that might count against our beliefs. We fail to see the flaws in faulty analogies. We take perverse delight in premises that appear to overthrow established opinions. We confuse cause with effect, or we identify events as causes when they are merely precursors. We judge a counter-premise guilty and dismiss it prematurely because of its associations. We allow ourselves to be distracted by matters that have nothing to do with the premise at all. We base arguments upon unexamined assumptions, sometimes because we don’t know how to conduct the examination, and sometimes because we are simply too lazy or too proud to go through the trouble. In all these ways (and more!) we end up thinking that our premises are more certain than they actually are.

We still have to read the Bible, and we still have to understand it. The assertions of the Bible are sufficiently clear that a decent reader can grasp its core affirmations without special intellectual equipment. In other words, Scripture is perspicuous. Some biblical teachings, however, are less clear. We ought to be careful, not only in the way that we affirm our understanding of the less certain teachings, but also in the way that we reason from them.

Dialogue.

George Herbert (1633)

Sweetest Savior, if my soul
Were but worth the having,
Quickly should I then control
Any though of waving.
But when all my care and pains
Cannot give the name of gains
To thy wretch so full of stains;
What delights or hope remains?
What (child) is the balance thine,
Thine the poise and measure?
If I say, Thou shalt be mine;
Finger not my treasure.
What the gains in having thee
Do amount to, only he,
Who for man was sold, can see;
That transferr’d th’ accounts to me.
But as I can see no merit,
Leading to this favor:
So the way to fit me for it,
Is beyond my savor.
As the reason then is thine;
So the way is none of mine:
I disclaim the whole design:
Sin disclaims and I resign.
That is all, if that I could
Get without repining;
And my clay my creature would
Follow my resigning.
That as I did freely part
With my glory and desert,
Left all joys to feel all smart–
Ah! no more: thou break’st my heart.—————-
^{This essay is by Kevin T. Bauder, president of Central Baptist Theological Seminary. Not every one of the professors, students, or alumni of Central Seminary necessarily agrees with every opinion that it expresses.}

Paul and Logic, Part One: Logic and What Is Written

By dan miller

Lately, SharperIron members have been discussing the question of applying the tool (or tools) of logic to Scripture. Are logical conclusions based on the Word as authoritative as the Word itself? Are they authoritative? If logic is required just to read and understand the messages of the Bible, then we must accept logic. So, how can we then question logic applied to Bible truths? Is the gathering of biblical data subject to the exact same noetic defects as making calculations based on that data? What logical system should we employ? Should laws like non-contradiction be treated as “God’s laws”? Did He create them or did we think them up and impose them on the Word without permission?

I do not believe that we will be able to effectively make an apologetic for some of these problems. Questioning everything can get tedious. Descartes, doubting everything, first had to conclude that he existed because he could think (”cogito, ergo sum”). There is a place in which faith must be exercised. Faith, after all, is “substance” when there is nothing firm to grasp and “evidence” of things outside our observation. So if I have scrubbed myself into a cognitive corner, it will be faith that gets me out the door playing with the other boys. I am simply going to make a couple statements that I believe about logic and the Word. If you agree with me, then come along beside me and let’s play some volleyball; this floor might be clean enough.

• I believe that God used human language to communicate so we would understand that which He wished us to understand.
• I believe that there are levels of authority with regard to reading Scripture. Or perhaps I should call them “levels of confidence” with regard to such authority.
  1. The true meaning of Scripture. We may or may not know this perfectly. Yet this is our absolute authority.
  2. Our understanding of primary biblical data. This is our understanding of the meaning of the messages of the Word. It is our highest tangible authority. Yet it is imperfect. It has come through the filters of copying, translation, and our own reading.
  3. Our understanding of doctrines which are logically derived from the primary biblical data. This also is imperfect, coming through the additional filter of our own reasoning. Doctrine is inferior to primary biblical data because it uses one more filter, but that relationship is occasionally reversed when we allow our doctrine to shape our reading (e.g., The Reformed theologian concluding that “all” doesn’t mean “all”).
• I believe that we must use logic in studying the Word. Yet I admit that I am not comfortable at all with forcing God into human logical “laws.” Is God subject to the law of non-contradiction? We might think so, but maybe not. However, trying to establish the correct logical system will be fruitless—we can’t logically prove one to be right without the correct selection of a logical system already in place. Therefore, my intent here is to try to take a look at how Paul reasoned from the Scriptures and what logic meant to him.

The first set of passages addresses the Paul-vs.-Apollos debate.

For it has been reported to me by Chloe’s people that there is quarreling among you, my brothers. What I mean is that each one of you says, “I follow Paul,” or “I follow Apollos,” or “I follow Cephas,” or “I follow Christ.” Is Christ divided? Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul? I thank God that I baptized none of you…” (1 Cor. 1:11-14, ESV)

For when one says, “I follow Paul,” and another, “I follow Apollos,” are you not being merely human? What then is Apollos? What is Paul? Servants through whom you believed, as the Lord assigned to each. (1 Cor. 3:4-5, ESV)

Paul is addressing a controversy between teachers. Some in the Corinthian church were Apollos-ists, and some were Paul-ians. How should Paul proceed to resolve this conflict? Perhaps he should have said, “Listen to me—I’m the apostle! I am inspired, so if Apollos disagrees, he’s wrong.” He could have, but he did not.

First, he reminds them that they are united in Christ. So far as they are both “in Christ,” they are united.

He also tells them:

• We will not have the final answer until the day of Christ.
• Their selection of one human teacher over another is a cheap substitute for following Christ.
• Their selection of one human over another gives boasting to men.

Most significantly for this paper, he gives them the solution to the problem of conflicting human doctrines.

This is how one should regard us, as servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God. Moreover, it is required of stewards that they be found trustworthy. But with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged by you or by any human court. In fact, I do not even judge myself. I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted. It is the Lord who judges me. Therefore do not pronounce judgment before the time, before the Lord comes, who will bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart. Then each one will receive his commendation from God.

I have applied all these things to myself and Apollos for your benefit, brothers, that you may learn by us not to go [phroneo–”think”] beyond what is written, that none of you may be puffed up in favor of one against another. For who sees anything different in you? What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if you did not receive it? (1 Cor. 4:1-7, ESV)

The solution is that neither Paul nor Apollos may go [”think,” TR] beyond “what is written.”

Those words “is written” are used throughout the New Testament to indicate quotes from the Old Testament. The perfect, passive, indicative use of grapho is used exclusively for references to Scripture, except for the names that were written in the “book of life” in Revelation. Prior to chapter 4 in 1 Corinthians, Paul used it in this way 4 times (1 Cor. 1:19, 1 Cor. 1:31, 1 Cor. 2:9, and 1 Cor. 3:19).

With regard to the recent discussion of logic and Scriptural authority, everyone in our forum agrees on some things. As Dr. Bauder said, “A sound inference is always the correct answer—otherwise, it would not be sound, no?” This 1 Corinthians passage teaches us a couple things about situations in which individuals disagree about what is sound.

1. We will not have the final answer about which inferences are correct until the judgment of Christ. Paul speaks here of “acquittal,” “judgment,” and “commendation.” We will be held responsible for our mistakes in logic. It is not proper, then, to take an “I’m okay; you’re okay” attitude. In our pursuit of doctrine, there is one correct “answer” to our questions. Note Paul’s words: “But with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged by you or by any human court.” Paul is telling them that they cannot declare the definite, true, final judgment that Christ will make. Also: “In fact, I do not even judge myself.” In fact, Paul himself cannot declare it. That answer has not yet been revealed to us. What we have is the Word of God and our reason.
2. The teachings of men are only faithful if they are not “hyper” to what is Written. If there is disagreement, then one or both may have gone beyond what is Written. The teacher and his inferences are subject to Scripture. The same principle for everyone—Paul included—is to evaluate their teachings by the Word. Therefore, Paul does hold the teachings of men to be submissive to and derivative of “what is Written.” Even so, Paul does not desist from making logical inferences (more on that in Parts 2 and 3). Nor does he ask Apollos or the Corinthians in general to do so.

Second Corinthians 10: 1-7 gives us a good look at Paul’s view of logic (logizomai) itself. Paul does not show the reasoning of the Corinthians or his own reasoning, so I won’t quote the passage. This passage does give us some information about how Paul views logizomai:

• It is a thought process that gives a result.
• That process is not infallible; thus, its result could be wrong (it can be thrown down). This is seen here, where Paul is contesting their opinion of him.
• If it is wrong, that is either because of faulty data (or faulty reasoning). In 2 Corinthians 10, it was faulty data.
• If it is wrong, then it should not be merely gainsaid. Nor does Paul want them to discard logic as a tool. Rather, Paul corrects their premises and tells them to repeat their reasoning.
• If one believes his premises to be correct (biblical or otherwise), then logizomai based on those premises should be treated as authoritative. However, this authority is always subject to scrutiny and re-examination. It has two layers of human work—data gathering from the Word and the processing of those data.

Paul would not fit the designation “alogical.” “Analogical” (”with much, repeated, reasoning”) would be better. He doesn’t protest logic. I don’t think anyone does. But we should not be saying, “There–that is SOUND. I’m done. I don’t need to think any more about that–everyone who disagrees is wrong.”

Yes, sound/necessary/God’s-logic conclusions that are based on biblical premises are indeed authoritative. But the answers to the question of which conclusions are necessary are not given to us. Our duty is to try to discern which doctrines fit this description. We hope to be as far along the asymptote to the true line of truth as possible.

And, yes, Paul does respect reason (logic). As we’ll see in Parts 2 and 3, he even treats it as authoritative. But his respect of it does not rise to the level of “what is Written.” There is a distinction for Paul. There is no doubt that Paul submitted to the authority of these conclusions. Yet he always treats his conclusions as authoritative for his reader insofar as his reader reasons along with him based on the Word. If one of his readers disagrees, that does not mean that he’s right in his own way. Paul knows that in the day of Christ, one of them will be judged, and one will be commended.
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^{Dan Miller is an ophthalmologist living in Cedar Falls, Iowa. He received a B.S. in Premed from Bob Jones University in 1991 and an M.D. from The University of South Carolina School of Medicine in 1995. He serves as youth leader and board member at Cedar Heights Baptist Church, also in Cedar Falls. He has been happily married to Jenny since 1992. His opinions are not necessarily those of his church or board.}